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ABSTRACT:	 In	 response	 to	 the	 euro	 area	 crisis,	 European	 policymakers	 took	 a	 gradual,	
incremental	 approach	 to	 official	 lending,	 at	 first	 relying	 on	 the	 approach	 followed	 by	 the	
International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 then	 developing	 their	 own	 crisis	 resolution	 framework.	 We	
review	 this	 development,	 marked	 by	 a	 substantial	 divergence	 in	 the	 terms	 of	 official	 loans	
offered	to	the	crisis	countries	by	the	IMF	and	the	euro	area	official	lenders.	Based	on	a	unique	
dataset,	we	use	event	analysis	to	assess	the	impact	of	changing	maturity	and	spreads	of	official	
loans	 on	 bond	 yields,	 liquidity	 and	market	 access.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 experience,	 we	
discuss	arguments	for	rebalancing	Debt	Sustainability	Analysis	and	programme	design	towards	

































IMF’s	 policy	 decisions	 and	 institutional	 development.1	 This	 comfortable	 situation,	
characterized	by	a	 smooth	exchange	of	 cash	 flows,	 knowledge,	 soft	 supervision	and	political	
influence,	 ended	 when	 it	 became	 apparent	 that	 even	 euro	 area	 countries	 needed	 external	
support	to	recover	from	their	acute	crises,	and	for	a	variety	of	reasons	this	was	to	be	provided	
by	the	IMF.	
At	 the	 outburst	 of	 the	 crisis,	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 IMF	 in	 the	 Greek	 rescue	 programme	





series	of	bilateral	government	 loans,	rather	than	a	 joint	European	loan.	 In	spite	that	 in	many	
dimensions	 the	 crisis	 countries	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 were	 quite	 different	 from	 the	 typical	 IMF	
programme	 country,	 the	 programme	 framework	 was	 initially	 designed	 according	 to	 IMF	
standards---with	 the	 notable	 exception	 that,	 given	 that	 the	 ECB	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 bend	 its	
conduct	 to	 the	 need	 of	 individual	 countries,	 the	 programmes’	 focus	 had	 to	 shift	 away	 from	
exchange	rates	and	monetary	policy,	and	place	 fiscal	gaps	and	structural	 reforms	at	 its	core.	
The	required	adjustment	was	to	be	agreed	upon	and	monitored	by	the	International	Monetary	
Fund,	the	European	Commission	and	the	European	Central	Bank.	2			
As	 it	 soon	 became	 apparent	 that	 this	 first	 policy	 reaction	 failed	 to	 bring	 the	 desired	
turnaround,	 euro	 area	 authorities	 began	 to	 devise	 incremental	 responses,	 and	 reached	
consensus	 on	 creating	 new	 institutions	 --	 first	 on	 a	 temporary	 basis	 (the	 European	 Financial	
Stability	 Facility	 and	 the	 European	 Financial	 Stability	 Mechanism),	 then	 moving	 towards	 a	
permanent	 framework	 for	 crisis	 resolution,	 built	 around	 the	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	
(ESM).	With	the	crisis	deepening	at	a	fast	pace,	 in	recognition	of	the	specific	 issues	raised	by	
the	 high	 degree	 of	 financial	 and	 real	 interconnectedness	 among	 members	 of	 a	 monetary	
union,	the	terms	of	the	European	official	support	were	adjusted,	and	the	euro	area	approach	
to	crisis	resolution	gradually	deviated	from	IMF	standards.	
The	 most	 striking	 illustration	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 euro	 area	 approach	 evolved	








assistance	 vehicles	 that	 the	 European	 authorities	 and	 policymakers	 created	 to	 intervene	 in	
Cyprus,	Spain,	Portugal,	 Ireland	and	Greece.	Table	1	provides	a	synthesis.	The	table	presents	
financing	 terms	per	 creditor	 and	 for	 programme	 country,	 at	 selected	dates.	 The	progressive	
divergence	in	loan	maturities	and	lending	rates	is	apparent.	
This	process	of	differentiation	did	not	come	without	tensions.	To	start	with,	in	order	to	be	able	
to	participate	 in	 the	euro	area	 rescues,	 the	 IMF	had	 to	modify	 its	 Exceptional	Access	Policy,	
used	 to	 deal	 with	 capital	 account	 crises,	 by	 introducing	 a	 so-called	 “systemic	 exemption”	
clause	(IMF,	2013a),	revoked	in	2016.	At	the	outset	of	the	crisis,	this	clause	allowed	the	IMF	to	
lend	 above	 normal	 limits,	 even	 if	 a	 country	 failed	 the	 sustainability	 tests	 (i.e.	 Debt	
Sustainability	Assessment,	DSA),	provided	a	default	could	have	systemic	effects.	Moreover,	in	
various	 crucial	 episodes,	 methodological	 and	 institutional	 differences	 between	 the	 IMF	 and	
euro	 area	 institutions	 translated	 into	 open	 disagreement.	 Although	 open	 disagreement	was	
eventually	 ironed	 out	 and	 did	 prevent	 action,	 it	was	 often	 clear	 that	 officials	 from	different	




This	paper	pursues	 two	 tasks.	First,	 it	 reviews	 the	evolution	of,	and	 the	debate	 surrounding,	
official	 lending	during	the	euro	area	crisis.	With	the	goal	of	drawing	lessons	for	the	design	of	
sovereign	 bailouts,	 we	 focus	 our	 discussion	 on	 benefits	 and	 issues	 associated	 to	 extending	
maturities	and	size	of	official	loans	beyond	the	standard	practice	of	the	IMF.	In	this	discussion,	
our	point	of	departure	 is	 the	notion	 that	 the	 terms	of	official	 lending	 (volumes,	 spreads	and	
maturities	of	official	 loans),	debt	sustainability	and	market	access	are	endogenously	linked	to	
each	other---a	point	that	we	explore	in	related	theoretical	work	(Corsetti	et	al	2017).	The	flow	









Maturity Interest	rate Maturity Interest	rate 5-year 10-year
May-10 5	years 4.041 3	years 3.23 8.31* 7.71
June-2011 10	years 3.78 3	years 3.53 15.97 22.93
March-2012 20	years 2.07 8	years 3.13 74.13 20.55
December-2012 30	years 0.93 8	years 3.07 n.a. 11.67
December-2010 7.5	years 5.25 7	years 3.37 n.a. 9.04
July-2011 15	years 2.74 7	years 3.53 11.35 10.62
June-2013 22	years 2.32 7	years 3.07 3.07 4.07
May-2011 7.5	years 5.47 7	years 3.37 11.06 9.38
July-2011 15	years 3.15 7	years 3.53 14.63 10.56
June-2013 22	years 2.19 7	years 3.07 5.17 6.38
Spain Nov-12 12.5	years 0.78 - - 4.17 5.3









space”	 for	 implementing	 reforms	 and	 macroeconomic	 correction	 policies.	 In	 this	 important	







various	 changes	 to	 the	 financial	 terms	 of	 the	 official	 loans	 experienced	 in	 the	 euro	 area	
provide	us	with	a	unique	opportunity	for	carrying	out	such	an	analysis.	Specifically,	focusing	on	
changes	 to	 the	maturities	 and	 interest	 rates	 of	 the	 programmes	 that	 were	 implemented	 in	
mid-2011,	 we	 show	 that	 (following	 loan	 modifications)	 yields	 dropped,	 previously	 inverted	
yield	 curves	 flattened,	 and	 market	 liquidity	 improved	 (as	 indicated	 by	 narrowing	 bid	 ask	
spreads).	 We	 document	 that	 these	 effects	 were	 stronger	 for	 the	 range	 of	 maturities	
corresponding	to	years	when	the	country’s	 refinancing	needs	 fell	 the	most	as	a	 result	of	 the	
maturity	extensions	and	interest	rate	reductions	on	the	official	loans.		Our	dataset	on	Official	
Loans	 to	 Euro	 Area	 Countries	 is	 described	 in	 detail	 in	 this	 text,	 and	 is	 made	 available	 for	
researchers	to	use.	




di	Mauro	2016	or	Zettelmeyer	et	al.	2017,	as	 long	as	 traditional	 frameworks	 fail	 to	 take	 into	









mostly	 on	 the	 first	 issue,	 we	 note	 here	 that	 there	 are	 important	 trade-offs	 in	 increasing	
program	 flexibility	 over	 cash	 flows	 and	 repayment	 horizons.	 A	 common	 concern	 is	 that	 this	















involved	 economies	 with	 highly	 integrated	 real	 and	 financial	 markets,	 where	 the	 spillovers	
from	a	crisis	country	can	have	systemic	consequences,	especially	in	the	region.	Regional	official	
lenders	may	have	strong	incentives	to	internalize	these	effects,	stronger	than	for	international	
institutions	 like	 the	 IMF.	 The	 collaboration	 between	 euro	 area	 institutions	 and	 the	 IMF	
provides	 an	 interesting	 case	 study	 for	 rethinking	 cooperation	 among	 official	 lenders	 in	 such	
cases	(see	Henning	2017	or	Ardagna	and	Caselli	2014).		
At	 an	 early	 stage	 of	 the	 crisis,	 fearing	 significant	 contagion	 and	 negative	 spillover	 effects	
throughout	 the	euro	area,	European	and	 international	 institutions	agreed	on	granting	access	
to	 official	 resources	 also	 to	 countries	 that	 would	 not	 pass	 the	 IMF’s	 Debt	 Sustainability	
Analysis.	The	early	 solution,	 to	 introduce	a	 ‘systemic	exemption’,	 soon	became	the	 target	of	
harsh	criticisms	within	the	IMF	on	several	grounds.	A	first	criticism	was	that	the	clause	reduced	
the	scope	for	bailing-in	private	creditors	(IMF,	2013c),	hence	increasing	the	risk	for	tax	payers	
(IMF	 2014).	 A	 second	 criticism	 was	 that,	 as	 the	 IMF	 would	 become	 exposed	 over	 longer	
periods	to	heavily	indebted	sovereigns,	its	status	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	sovereigns	would	
be	 in	danger	 (Reinhart	and	Trebesch,	2016).	 In	2016,	when	 the	exemption	was	 revoked,	 the	
new	 rule	 stipulated	 that,	when	 sustainability	 is	 not	 certain,	 the	 IMF	 could	 lend	only	 if	 other	
official	 creditors	 commit	 to	 cover	 any	 potential	 financial	 gap	 that	 could	 lead	 the	 country	 to	
default.		
A	closely	related	issue	is	at	the	core	of	current	debates	at	the	IMF	and	other	regional	financing	
institutions.	 There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 design	 adequate	 mechanisms	 to	 coordinate	 supranational	
(global	and	regional)	financing	institutions’	activities	as	members	of	the	global	financial	safety	
net.8	 	 If	 the	 insights	 from	the	euro	area	crisis	have	any	bite,	multilateral	and	regional	official	
lenders	could	do	well	by	rebalancing	their	models	of	cooperation,	and	working	out	an	efficient	
way	 to	 coordinate	 the	 repayment	 cash-flow	 structures	 resulting	 from	 their	 loans,	 while	
considering	the	degree	of	seniority	that	multilateral	and	regional	lenders	may	have.9		
The	 remainder	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 II	 details	 the	 institutional	
developments	 leading	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 permanent	 crisis	 resolution	 institution,	 with	 a	




















Section	 III	 contrasts	 the	 approach	 by	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	 European	 institutions,	 looking	 into	
economic	 and	 institutional	 factors	 shaping	 their	 behaviour,	 and	 reviews	 some	 evidence.	
Section	IV	analyses	a	set	of	open	issues	in	theory	and	policy,	including	sustainability,	seniority,	
market	 access,	 private	 sector	 involvement	 (debt	 restructuring),	 and	 welfare	motivation	 and	







the	 vulnerability	 of	 euro	 area	 countries	 to	 volatile	 movements	 in	 capital	 flows	 and	 cross-
border	 investment.10	 Policymakers	 and	 international	 institutions	 failed	 to	 see	 that	 euro	area	
countries	 could	be	exposed	 to	 the	 same	kind	of	boom	and	bust	 cycles	associated	with	 large	
outswings	 in	cross-border	capital	 flows	that	had	affected	emerging	economies	after	 financial	
liberalization.	On	the	contrary,	 the	rapid	growth	 in	domestic	private	debt,	 the	accompanying	
housing	booms,	and	the	accumulation	of	very	large	imbalances	in	the	internal	current	account	
across	member	 states	were	 sometimes	 interpreted	as	 indicators	of	 successful	economic	and	
financial	 integration.11	 Indeed,	 these	 facts	 were	 periodically	 reviewed	 by	 the	 euro	 area	
institutions	as	well	as	by	the	 IMF,	however	without	 triggering	any	specific	 initiative	aimed	at	
containing	vulnerabilities	(see	Schadler	2014).		
A	key	issue	blurring	risk	assessment	was	that,	within	a	monetary	union,	the	classical	problem	
in	 a	 balance	 of	 payment	 crisis---the	 availability	 of	 international	 reserves	 ---	 is	 not	 a	 policy	
concern.	 In	 the	euro	area,	 financing	gaps	arising	 from	net	capital	outflows	and	 trade	deficits	
are	automatically	balanced	by	the	European	System	of	Central	Banks,	which	steps	in	to	insure	
the	 smooth	 working	 of	 real	 and	 financial	 transactions	 within	 the	 union	 (via	 the	 Target2	
system).	However,	as	became	clear	at	the	onset	of	the	crisis,	the	fact	that	euro	area	countries	
do	not	face	a	balance-of-payment	constraint	(no	scarcity	of	means	of	cross-border	payments)	




of	country	 risk	affecting	all	 residents,	 including	public	 institutions,	 financial	and	non-financial	
firms	 as	 well	 as	 households.12	 This	 is	 precisely	 what	 occurred	 in	 the	 euro	 area,	 causing	
retrenchment	and	deep	segmentation	of	financial	systems	across	borders.	
The	crisis	specific	to	the	euro	began	at	the	end	of	2009,	when	the	true	magnitude	of	the	Greek	
public	 imbalances	 became	 public	 and	 the	 G20	 reversed	 its	 early	 support	 for	 fiscal	 stimulus,	








confidence	plummeted,	 the	euro	area	 institutional	 framework	offered	no	policy	 instruments,	
specific	procedures	or	designated	bodies	to	deal	with	the	looming	crisis.	Indeed,	the	euro	area	
economic	 governance	 was	 built	 around	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 Stability	 and	 Growth	 Pact,	
together	with	the	prohibition	of	monetary	financing	by	the	European	Central	Bank,	would	be	
sufficient	 to	make	 the	 ‘no	bail-out’	 clause	 a	binding	 constraint.	 The	need	 to	 reform	became	




of	 implementing	 a	 timely	 and	 effective	 joint	 response	 to	 the	 shocks	 undermining	 stability,	
while	agreeing	on	key	institutional	reforms	shaping	the	future	of	the	union.	Strong	differences	








When	 the	 Greek	 Government	 first	 approached	 its	 euro	 area	 partners	 explaining	 its	 difficult	
fiscal	and	financial	conditions,	there	was	no	formal	or	informal	blueprint	at	the	euro	area	level	
that	governments	could	rely	upon	to	shape	a	common	strategy.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	
the	 IMF	 and	 the	 EU	 did	 cooperate	 in	 funding	 financial	 assistance	 programmes	 to	 Eastern	
European	 countries	 (Hungary,	 Latvia	 and	 Romania)	 through	 the	 Medium-Term	 Financial	
assistance	(MTFA)	or	the	so-called	EU	Balance-of-Payments	Facility	(EU	BoP).	But	the	context	
in	 Eastern	 Europe	was	 quite	 different	 and	 the	MTFA/EU	 BoP	 Facility	 were	 not	 available	 for	
euro	area	countries.13		The	immediate	reaction	was	to	request	Greece	to	carry	out	a	significant	
fiscal	 adjustment---a	 solution	 that	 failed	 to	 prevent	 further	 strong	 deterioration	 of	 market	
confidence.	The	situation	soon	spun	out	of	control.	
In	March	2010,	euro	area	governments	agreed	to	have	the	IMF	on	board	and	provide	Greece	
with	 a	 financial	 assistance	 programme	 consisting	 of	 IMF	 credit,	 via	 a	 Stand-By-Agreement	
(SBA),	and	bilateral	 loans	by	other	euro	area	members,	via	the	Greek	Loan	Facility	(GLF).	The	
programme	totalled	110	billion	EUR.	The	disbursement	of	the	bilateral	loans	would	be	decided	
by	unanimity	and	subject	 to	conditionality,	assessed	by	 the	EC,	 the	ECB,	and	the	 IMF---often	
referred	to	as	the	‘Troika’	—in	collaboration	with	the	Greek	authorities.	The	first	mission	was	









month	 Euribor,	 that	 is,	 100	 bps	 above	 the	 standard	 IMF	 practice.14	 For	 credit	 outstanding	
beyond	three	years,	the	costs	were	to	increase	by	further	100	bps.	As	noted	by	Jost	and	Seitz	
(2012)	 and	 Pisani-Ferry	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 these	 relatively	 high	 surcharges	 (although	 still	 below	
market	 rates)	 were	 demanded	 by	 some	 euro	 area	 governments,	 concerned	 with	 the	






emphasized	 by	 many	 observers	 (see,	 again,	 Jost	 and	 Seitz	 2012),	 a	 number	 of	 European	
policymakers	 shared	 a	 profound	 scepticism	on	 the	 capacity	 of	 euro	 area	 institutions	 to	 deal	
with	 any	 acute	 crisis	 without	 bending	 to	 political	 pressures.	 A	 few	 euro	 area	 governments	
preferred	 to	 operate	 through	 bilateral	 engagement	 (via	 government	 to	 government	 loans),	




issue.	 The	 large	 amount	 of	 resources	 requested	 by	 Greece	 could	 only	 be	 granted	 using	 the	
Exceptional	 Access	 Policy	 (EAP).	 But	 at	 the	 time,	 access	 to	 EAP	 was	 conditional	 on	 a	 Debt	
Sustainability	Assessment	(DSA)	showing	that	the	country’s	public	debt	be	sustainable	with	a	
high	 probability.	 For	 Greece,	 this	 was	 clearly	 not	 the	 case	 (see	 IMF	 2014).	 As	 reported	 by	
Schadler	 (2013),	 strong	 political	 pressures	 on	 the	 institution,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 to	 act	
swiftly	 in	 view	 of	 the	 perceived	 threat	 of	 a	 systemic	melt	 down,	 led	 the	 IMF	 to	modify	 the	
conditions	 for	 accessing	 the	 EAP.16	 An	 exception	was	 introduced,	 giving	 access	 to	 the	 Fund	
resources	to	countries	whose	debt	could	not	be	considered	“sustainable	with	high	likelihood’’,	







resting	 exclusively	 on	 bilateral	 agreements	 and	 took	 steps	 towards	 the	 creation	 of	 jointly	
managed	institutions.	A	key	decision	was	taken	already	in	May	2010,	when	the	Ecofin	Council	
created	 the	 European	 Financial	 Stabilisation	 Mechanism	 (EFSM)	 along	 with	 the	 European	










guarantees	 on	market	 financing.17	 Beyond	 this,	 the	 template	 of	 the	 EFSM/EFSF	 programme	
remained	the	same	as	that	applied	earlier	in	Greece.		
The	EFSM	became	operational	on	the	10th	of	May	of	2010,	with	the	stated	aim	of	preserving	
financial	 stability	 by	 providing	 financial	 assistance	 to	 member	 states	 of	 the	 euro	 area	 in	
economic	difficulties.	 Its	design	was	that	of	an	emergency	funding	programme,	administered	










end	of	 its	housing	bubble)	and	the	 fiscal	consequences	of	 the	bail	out	of	 its	banking	system.	
The	 Irish	programme,	 signed	 in	December	2010,	 consisted	of	 a	 financing	package	of	 EUR	85	
billion,	to	be	disbursed	over	three	years.	20	It	included	contributions	by	the	EFSM	(22.5	billion)	





the	 programme	 financed	 78	 billion	 euro,	 falling	 in	 equal	 parts	 on	 the	 European	 Financial	
Stabilisation	 Mechanism,	 European	 Financial	 Stability	 Facility	 and	 International	 Monetary	
Fund.	There	was	an	important	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	and	EFSM	official	loans.	While	
the	maturity	of	 the	 loan	was	 the	same	as	 in	 the	 Irish	programme,	7.5	years,	 the	spread	was	
lower,	210	bps.	In	addition,	Portugal	signed	a	7-year	EFF	programme	with	the	IMF.		
Under	 the	 pressure	 of	 a	 steadily	 deteriorating	 financial	 outlook,	 in	 June	 2011	 euro	 area	
authorities	 concluded	 the	 negotiations	 on	 setting-up	 a	 permanent	 crisis-fighting	 institution,	
the	European	Stability	Mechanism	 (ESM),	 to	become	operational	by	2014.22	 In	 July	2011,	 an	

















possible.	 The	 ESM	 was	 set	 to	 provide	 loans	 for	 the	 indirect	 recapitalization	 of	 financial	
institutions,	 and	 to	 intervene	 directly	 in	 the	 sovereign	 bond	 markets,	 both	 primary	 and	
secondary,	and	(later	on)	 in	extreme	cases,	 to	provide	direct	bank	recapitalization	via	capital	
participation.	 The	 bank	 recapitalization	 facility,	 created	 to	 provide	 assistance	 for	 the	
management	 of	 banking	 crises,	 requires	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 conditionality,	 focused	 on	 the	
financial	 sector.	 The	 bank	 recapitalisation	 facilities	 created	 the	 premise	 for	 official	 support	
programmes	without	the	IMF’s	financial	participation.23	
In	parallel,	in	spite	of	the	optimism	of	the	first	programme	review,	emphasizing	“an	impressive	





IMF,	 envisioned	 additional	 funding	 for	 130	 billion	 euro,	 which	 were	 to	 be	 added	 to	 34.5	
undisbursed	funds	from	the	GLF.	From	the	130	billion	euro,	25	came	from	a	new	IMF	7-year	
EFF	programme.	The	rest	(104	billion)	was	provided	by	the	EFSF,	with	a	20	year	maturity	and	











on	 inaugurating	 the	 ESM	 at	 an	 earlier	 date	 than	 initially	 scheduled.	 The	 ESM	 entered	 into	
action	in	October	2012,	with	500	billion	lending	capacity	supported	by	700	billion	in	capital.27	
From	an	institutional	perspective,	the	creation	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	endowed	

















the	 weight	 of	 euro	 area	 official	 financing	 increased	 markedly.	 The	 ESM	 contributed	 with	 9	
billion	 euro,	 while	 the	 IMF	 contribution	 was	 limited	 to	 1	 billion	 euro.	 The	 ESM	 assistance	
programme	 of	 9	 billion	 euros	 was	 agreed	 in	March	 2013.	 Eventually,	 however,	 the	 country	
only	requested	disbursements	for	6.3	billion	euros	in	loans.		In	Spain,	Greece	and	Cyprus,	the	
ESM	programmes	featured	relatively	long	maturities.	In	the	case	of	Spain	the	average	maturity	












Official	 support	 programmes	 in	 the	 euro	 area	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 various	 renegotiations,	
much	more	 so	 than	 IMF	 programmes,	 which	 only	 featured	 a	move	 from	 an	 SBA	 to	 an	 EFF	




source	 of	 uncertainty	 was	 the	 depth	 of	 euro	 area	 interdependence,	 determining	 the	
vulnerability	 of	member	 states	 to	 cross-border	 spillovers.32	Authorities	had	 little	 guidance	 in	























area	 authorities,	 related	 to	 the	 Greek	 authorities’	 lack	 of	 ownership	 of	 the	 reform	 efforts	
(Balassone	 and	 Committeri,	 2015).	 Conditions	 were	 first	 softened	 in	 June	 2011,	 when	
maturities	were	extended	by	an	additional	5	years,	and	spreads	reduced	to	those	of	the	 IMF	
loan.	 The	 second	 programme,	 signed	 with	 the	 EFSF,	 featured	 a	 much	 longer	 maturity	 and	
grace	period	(15	and	10	years	respectively)	and	an	even	lower	spread	(150	bps).	These	milder	
conditions	were	 further	extended	to	 the	GLF.34	Another	change	occurred	 in	December	2012,	
when	the	Eurogroup	amended	the	EFSF	loan	and	the	GLF.	The	main	changes	were	a	reduction	
on	 some	 fees	 and	 margins	 to	 zero,	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 programme	 size,	 an	 extension	 of	
maturities	 up	 to	 32.5	 years	 and	 a	 ten-year	 interest	 deferral.	 As	 regards	 the	 GLF,	maturities	
were	extended	to	30	years	and	margins	lowered	to	50	bps.	
Initially,	 in	 2010,	 the	 Irish	 EFSF	 programme	 featured	 IMF-comparable	maturities	 and	 higher	
spreads	(EFSF,	2010).	When	the	Portuguese	programme	was	signed	several	months	later,	using	
the	same	vehicle,	the	terms	of	the	financial	agreement	featured	a	spread	almost	50	bps	lower	
(EFSF,	 2011).	 In	 part,	 these	 lower	 charges	 reflected	 the	 fact	 that	 by	 that	 time	 the	 Greek	
programme	 was	 performing	 well	 below	 expectations,	 and	 the	 authorities	 were	 already	
discussing	 cutting	 the	 borrowing	 costs	 for	 this	 country.	 In	 any	 case,	 after	 the	 signing	 of	 the	
Portuguese	 programme,	 the	 lending	 conditions	 quickly	 underwent	 a	 profound	 revision.	 In	
particular,	 between	May	 and	 July	 2011,	 for	 both	 Ireland	 and	 Portugal,	 the	 spreads	 for	 both	




change	 in	 the	 financing	 terms	 of	 the	 Irish	 and	 Portuguese	 loans	 was	 implemented	 in	 April	





four	 year	 maturity),	 12.5	 year	 for	 Spain,	 and	 32	 years	 for	 Greece.	 Similarly,	 the	 borrowing	
spread	is	at	30	bps	for	Spain	and	10	bps	for	Cyprus	and	Greece.		
Beyond	the	initial	move	in	Greece	from	an	SBA	to	an	EFF	programme,	and	the	subsequent	use	
of	 EFF	 style	 agreements	 in	 Ireland	 and	 Portugal,	 IMF	 lending	 terms	 have	 not	 matched	 the	
significant	 changes	 in	 ESM	 lending	 terms,	 giving	 rise	 to	 significant	 divergences	 across	



























May-10 GLF 3	years 80	bill 5	years	(	+3	grace	period) 300-400	bps SBA* 3	years 30	bill 3	years 200-300	bps
June-2011 GLF 10	years 200-300	bps
March-2012 GLF 20	years	 150	bps
March-2012 EFSF 3.5	years 144.7	bill 20	years 150	bps EFF 4	years 28	bill 8	years 200-300	bps
December-2012 EFSF 30	years	(	+10	grace	period) 0	bps
December-2012 GLF 30	years	(	+10	grace	period) 50	bps
December-2010 EFSM 3	years 22.5	bill 7.5	years 250	bps
December-2010 EFSF 3	years 17.7	bill 7.5	years 250	bps EFF 4	years 22.5	bill 8	years 200-300	bps
July-2011 EFSF/EFSM 15	years 0	bps
June-2013 EFSF/EFSM 22	years
May-2011 EFSM 3	year 26	bill 7.5	years 215	bps
May-2011 EFSF 3	year 26	bill 7.5	years 210	bps EFF 4years 26	bill 5	years 200-300	bps
July-2011 EFSF/EFSM 15	years 0	bps
June-2013 EFSF/EFSM 22	years
Nov-12 ESM 2	years 100	bill** 12.5	years 30	bps - - - - -
May-13 ESM 3	years 9	bill 15	years 10	bps EFF 4	years 1	bill 4	years 200-300	bps















differences	 in	 the	operational	and	 institutional	 framework	of	 the	 IMF	and	the	ESM	that	may	






of	 payments	 difficulties.	 IMF	 lending	 aims	 to	 provide	 a	 cushion	 that	 eases	 the	 adjustment	
policies	and	 reforms	 that	a	 country	must	make	 to	 correct	 its	balance	of	payments	problems	
and	re-establish	external	viability	and	economic	stability	and	growth.	The	traditional	resolution	
of	 external	 problems	 includes,	 in	 addition	 to	 fiscal	 policy	 measures	 and	 structural	 reforms,	
adjustments	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 pursued	 through	 interest	 rate	 policy	 and	 international	
reserves	management.36		
According	to	the	IMF’s	lending	framework,	first,	IMF	lending	can	only	be	provided	to	countries	
that	 are	 solvent,	 but	 suffering	 a	 temporary	 financing	 shortage;	 second,	 loans	 are	 extended	
only	 provided	 the	 country	 agrees	 on	 a	 pre-defined	 program	 of	 economic	 reforms---the	 so	
called	 conditionality.	 The	 rationale	 for	 this	 exchange,	 resources	 vs.	 conditionality,	 has	many	
layers,	all	impinging	on	Debt	Sustainability	Analysis.	
Since	IMF	lending	is	meant	to	help	solvent	countries	overcome	temporary	financing	shortages,	
its	 lending	model	 revolves	 on	 an	 assessment	 of	 debt	 sustainability,	 via	 a	 DSA	 (IMF,	 2013b).	
Prior	 to	 the	 signing	 of	 any	 loan	 agreement	 and	 to	 any	 disbursement,	 the	 IMF	 evaluates	
whether	 the	 country’s	 debt	 is	 sustainable,	 i.e.	 the	 country	 is	 able	 to	 honour	 its	 (official)	
liabilities.	 But	 this	 assessment	 is	 conducted	 conditional	 on	 complying	 with	 the	 adjustment	
policies	 included	 the	 programme.37	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 subsidized	 lending	may	 reduce	 the	
authorities’	 incentives	 to	act	on	 improving	economic	 conditions,	 conditionality	measures	are	
meant	 to	 safeguard	 IMF	 resources	 by	 ensuring	 that	 the	 countries	 will	 implement	 a	 set	 of	
policies	 guaranteeing	 that	 their	 situation	will	 permit	 the	 repayment	of	 the	 IMF	 loan.	On	 the	
other	hand,	while	conditionality	is	motivated	by	the	need	to	minimize	the	risk	of	losses	for	the	
IMF,	 it	 is	 also	 fully	 consistent	 with	 the	 rationale	 for	 offering	 liquidity	 support	 to	 countries	
willing	 to	 restore	 macroeconomic	 and	 financial	 stability	 via	 costly	 budget	 corrections	 and	













not	 lend	 until	 the	 country	 undergoes	 a	 debt	 restructuring	 that	 brings	 (fiscal)	 sustainability	
back.39		
The	two	IMF’s	traditional	(non-concessional)	instruments	for	crisis	resolution	are	the	Stand-By	
Arrangement	 (SBA),	 and	 the	 Extended	 Fund	 Facility	 (EFF).	 The	 SBA	 aims	 to	 help	 member	
countries	addressing	short-term	balance	of	payments	problems.	Differently	from	the	SBA,	the	






of	 the	 3–month	 SDR	 rate	 (this	 is	 known	 as	 the	 basic	 rate	 of	 charge).	 The	 Fund	 applied	 a	
surcharge	 of	 200	 bps	 for	 credit	 above	 300%	of	 the	 quota,	 and	 additional	 100	 bps	 for	 credit	
outstanding	 after	 3	 years---the	 premium	 being	 structured	 in	 order	 to	 discourage	 large	 and	
prolonged	 use	 of	 IMF	 resources.	 In	 2016,	 the	 IMF	 carried	 out	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 pricing	 and	





to	 traditional	 trade	 balance-related	 problems.	 Faced	with	 ever	 growing	 cross-border	 capital	
flows,	the	IMF	resources	became	increasingly	inadequate	to	play	a	significant	role	in	this	new	
breed	of	crises.	In	particular,	the	size	of	the	capital	flow	reversals	during	the	Asian	crises	in	the	









precautionary	 basis,	 others	 free	 of	 conditionality.41	 As	 already	 discussed,	 around	 that	 same	
period,	the	Greek	crisis	challenged	the	IMF	framework,	with	the	prospects	of	systemic	fallout	
from	 debt	 restructuring.	 The	 immediate	 reaction	 was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 so-called	






















resolution	 infrastructure	 is	 that	 programmes	 can	 address	 diverse	 problems,	 from	 fiscal	 and	
structural	 imbalances	to	banking	sector	issues,	and	not	only	external	 imbalances.	Indeed,	the	
euro	 area	 experience	 shows	 that	 crises	 may	 have	 different	 roots	 and	 reflect	 different	
imbalances	 across	 countries.	 Specifically,	 the	 ESM	 toolbox	 contains	 loans	 for	 intervening	
directly	 in	primary	and	 secondary	markets,	 loans	 for	 the	 indirect	 recapitalization	of	 financial	






a	 stronger	 incentive	 (or	perhaps	be	 in	a	better	position)	 to	 internalize	 spillovers	both	across	
borders	and	across	type	of	borrowers	 in	the	monetary	union.	While,	analogously	to	the	 IMF,	
the	ESM	does	not	lend	against	insolvency	and	evaluates	a	country	position	ex-ante	by	means	
of	 a	 debt	 sustainability	 analysis,	 it	 may	 pay	 more	 attention	 to	 cross-border	 spillovers,	 and	
possibly	engage	with	countries	whose	debt	sustainability	is	not	guaranteed.	The	IMF	could	also	
temporarily	 do	 so	 through	 the	 systemic	 exemption	 clause,	 but	 the	 clause	 was	 removed	 in	
2016.		
A	third	important	difference	concerns	seniority.	As	of	today,	the	IMF	is	a	senior	creditor	to	the	


















Overall,	 there	 are	 visible	 differences	 in	 the	 pricing	 and	maturity	 structures	 of	 IMF	 and	 ESM	









summarised	 in	 Table	 4.	 	 For	 the	 ESM,	 the	maximum	 loan	maturity	 can	 vary,	 as	 there	 is	 no	
















Standard	Loans Cost	of	funding 10 Yes 200	bps




Cost	of	funding 30 Yes 200	bps
Primary	Market	Facility Cost	of	funding 10-35 Yes 200	bps































We	summarize	 key	evidence	on	official	 lending	by	 the	 two	 institutions	 to	 the	 four	 countries	
under	joint	IMF-ESM	programmes	in	Figures	1	through	3	below.45	
Figure	 1	 illustrates	 the	 increasing	 engagement	 by	 the	 euro	 area	 official	 lenders	 with	 the	
programme	countries.	 The	euro	area	official	programmes	are	 significantly	 larger	 in	 size	 than	
IMF	programmes.	Before	2011,	the	correlation	between	debt	level	and	spreads	is	positive,	as	
one	 may	 logically	 expect.	 Strikingly,	 the	 correlation	 changed	 sign	 and/or	 zeroed	 starting	 in	
2011,	 as	 the	 stock	 of	 crisis	 countries’	 public	 liabilities	 became	 increasingly	 owed	 to	 official	
creditors.	 In	 turn,	 Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 dynamics	 of	 borrowing	 costs,	 by	 sources	 of	 financing:	
marketable	 instruments,	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 rates	 and	 the	 rate	 on	 the	 euro	 area	
facilities.	 As	 already	 discussed,	 during	 the	 first	 stages	 of	 the	 crisis,	 the	 Greek,	 Irish	 and	
Portuguese	 loans	by	the	euro	area	official	 lenders	were	more	expensive	than	those	provided	











The	 European	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 clearly	 reflects	 contextual	 and	 institutional	 specificities.	
Yet,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 laboratory	where	 policymakers	 experimented	 novel	 vehicles	 to	
deliver	official	lending	---aimed	at	fostering	debt	sustainability	and	restore	market	confidence,	
without	requiring	the	official	lender	to	bear	systematic	losses.	In	particular,	relative	to	the	IMF,	
the	 euro	 area	 experience	 appears	 to	have	placed	much	more	weigh	on	 the	management	of	
loan-related	 cash	 flows,	 as	 a	 way	 to	 foster	 policy	 efforts	 and	 adjustment	 in	 the	 borrowing	






















































































































lessons	 from	 the	 evidence	 available	 at	 this	 stage.	 Moreover,	 the	 goal	 of	 our	 analysis	 is	
necessarily	 limited---we	 do	 not	 aim	 to	 be	 exhaustive.	 While	 discussing	 at	 length	 some	
elements	 relevant	 to	 the	 ongoing	 debates	 on	 official	 lending,	 we	 leave	 other,	 equally	
important	 ones,	 in	 the	 background.	 Namely,	 we	 do	 not	 discuss	 how	 longer	 and	 larger	








the	 IMF	 is	 largely	 a	 technocratic	 institution,	 while	 ECOFIN	 is	 made	 up	 of	 politicians,	 one	 may	 expect	 the	























































Assessing	 debt	 sustainability	 is	 a	 complex,	 forward-looking	 and	multidimensional	 task---	 it	 is	
well	 understood	 that	 no	 single	 indicator	 can	 provide	 reliable	 guidance.	 Yet,	 the	 level	 and	
dynamics	of	debt	stocks	have	long	played	the	leading	role	in	official	frameworks.	The	following	
quote	exemplifies	this	long-prevailing	view	(IMF,	2013b):	
	“In	 general	 terms,	 public	 debt	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 sustainable	 when	 the	 primary	
balance	 needed	 to	 at	 least	 stabilize	 debt	 under	 both	 the	 baseline	 and	 realistic	 shock	





While	 recognizing	 the	 importance	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	 roll-over	 risks,	 this	 definition	 is	
articulated	 around	 the	 level	 of	 debt,	 leading	 to	 policy	 recommendations	 along	 the	 lines	 of	
“debt	will	be	sustainable	 if	debt	stocks	 reach	 level	X	by	year	Y”.	 48	 In	practice,	moreover,	 the	




raised	 an	 intense	 debate	 on	 the	 adequacy	 of	 this	 “stock-based	 approach”	 to	 sustainability.	
Interventions	 in	the	euro	area	have	been	motivated	with	the	notion	that,	by	deploying	back-
loaded	 loans	 and	 lowering	 re-financing	 needs,	 official	 lending	 reduces	 crisis	 countries’	




discomfort	with	 the	way	debt	 sustainability	has	 traditionally	been	assessed	 recently	 led	 to	a	
fine-tuning	of	DSA	 frameworks.49	Along	 the	 lines	of	 the	 IMF’s	“acceptably	 low	rollover	 risk	“,	
the	DSA	now	 takes	 a	 closer	 look	 to	 debt	 flows	 by	 also	monitoring	 an	 additional	metric	 that	
accounts	 for	 potential	 difficulties	 that	 a	 country	 may	 face	 in	 meeting	 upcoming	 financing	
needs.50	In	practice,	the	DSA	framework	now	requires	monitoring	the	so-called	Gross	Financing	
Needs	 (GFN),	 as	 these	 should	 not	 exceed	 a	 pre-set	 risk-threshold.51	 As	 a	 measure	 of	 the	
forthcoming	 financing	 needs	 of	 a	 country,	 GFN	 adds	 up	 interest	 payments,	 principal	
repayments,	the	primary	deficit,	and	other	one-off	outlays.	















which	 official	 loans	 affected	 cash	 flows	 from	 official	 debt	 obligations,	 comparing	 the	 debt	
repayment	 profile	 by	 type	of	 creditor,	 for	 Portugal	 and	 Ireland,	 before	 and	 after	 the	official	
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A	 final	 piece	 of	 evidence	 regarding	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 official	 loans	 affected	 the	 interest	
payment	from	the	existing	debt	stocks	is	provided	by	Figure	6b	(see	also	ESM	2017).	The	figure	
presents	calculations	of	the	(ceteris-paribus)	cumulative	reduction	in	nominal	interest	costs	in	
the	 period	 2011-2016	 (following	 the	 access	 to	 official	 support	 by	 the	 ESM),	 relative	 to	 both	








note	 that	 the	 figure	does	not	 include	savings	 from	the	EFSM,	GLF	and	other	bilateral	official	
loans.53	While	 an	 order	 of	magnitude	 smaller,	 savings	 are	 also	 non-negligible	 relative	 to	 the	
IMF	lending	conditions.54	
On	methodological	and	conceptual	grounds,	this	new	style	of	official	 lending	faces	significant	
hurdles.	 With	 the	 lengthening	 of	 the	 lending	 horizon,	 comes	 the	 need	 for	 lengthening	 the	
horizon	of	debt	sustainability	analysis,	well	in	excess	of	the	conventional	ten-year	horizon	used	



















Since	 the	 inception	of	 the	global	 financial	 crisis,	 domestic	 and	 international	 authorities	have	
deployed	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 policies	 to	 sustain	 activity,	 re-float	 banks’	 balance	 sheet	 and	
stabilised	sovereign	bond	markets.	Central	Banks	have	brought	policy	rates	to	their	historical	
minima,	 carried	 out	 balance	 sheet	 policies	 and	 engaged	 in	 forward	 guidance;	 governments	
pursued	fiscal	accommodation.	All	these	measures	have	been	the	subject	of	numerous	impact	




objective	 of	 lending	 programmes,	 restoring	 market	 access	 at	 sustainable	 conditions.	 A	 key	
question	 concerns	 the	 extent	 to	 which,	 by	 shifting	 forward	 in	 time	 and	 smoothing	 debt	
repayment	flows,	official	loans	hold	the	potential	to	widen	the	window	for	market	financing.	
The	fact	that	euro	area	official	loans	underwent	various	changes	over	time	provides	us	with	an	
opportunity	 to	 assess	 how	market	 prices	 and	 quantities	 reacted	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 terms	 of	
official	loans.	In	this	section,	we	do	so	by	performing	an	event	analysis	of	the	market	response	







The	 key	 changes	 in	 the	 programme	were	 already	 outlined	 in	 a	 previous	 section.	We	 repeat	
them	 here	 for	 convenience.	 Ireland	 received	 the	 first	 financial	 package,	 totalling	 85	 billion	
euros,	 in	December	2010.	Of	this,	40.2	billion	euros	were	funded	by	the	EFSF/EFSM.	 Initially,	
the	 loan	 carried	 a	margin	 of	 250	 bps	 (over	 the	 EFSF/EFSM	 funding	 costs)	 with	 a	maximum	
average	maturity	of	7.5	years.	In	July	2011,	however,	EA	members	granted	Ireland	a	reduction	




EFSF/EFSM.	 At	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 programme,	 Portugal	 agreed	 to	 pay	 a	 margin	 of	 210	 basis	









aligned	 Portugal’s	 terms	 to	 those	 also	 granted	 to	 Ireland.	 The	maturity	was	 extended	 to	 15	











shifting	 repayments	 into	 the	 future,	 affecting	 private	 creditors’	 expectations,	 and	 thus	
potentially	 opening	 a	window	 for	 accessing	market	 finance.	We	expect	 the	effects	 of	 a	 loan	
maturity	 extension	 to	 differ	 across	maturities,	 and	 to	 be	 stronger	 over	 segments	where	 the	







year	 yields	 on	 Irish	 bonds	 averaged	 16.47%,	 and	 the	 yield	 curve	 was	 inverted.	 The	
announcement	of	the	changes	had	a	strong	and	long-lasting	positive	effect.	Already	after	one	
month,	all	yields	had	fallen	substantially.	After	three	months,	yields	went	down	further	and	the	
curve	 had	 flattened	 out.	 The	 curve	 shifted	 downward,	 reflecting	 overall	 better	 solvency	
prospects,	and	flattens	out,	as	the	interventions	eased	concerns	about	default.	
The	 loan	amendments	provided	a	7.5	years	window	of	reduced	debt	repayments:	 it	 is	within	




on	 Figure	 8B	 shows	 that,	 after	 the	 loan	 changes,	 the	 yield	 curve	 shifted	down,	 especially	 at	
shorter	 maturities.	 The	 improvement	 only	 partly	 reversed	 in	 the	 subsequent	 two	 months.	
Reflecting	the	limited	effect	of	the	first	amendment	to	the	Portuguese	loan,	however,	the	drop	
was	half	as	large	as	that	on	Irish	bid-ask	spreads.	
































the	 figures	regarding	the	effect	of	 the	changes	to	 the	 Irish	and	Portuguese	 loans	 in	2013.	As	
apparent	 from	 those	 figures,	 Ireland	was	 already	 facing	 significantly	 lower	 yields	 before	 the	
programme	change	announcement.	Still,	following	the	announcement,	yields	on	the	3	and	10-
year	fell	further.	Consistent	with	the	normalisation	of	the	Irish	bond	market,	the	reduction	on	
bid-ask	 spreads	 was	 smaller.	 A	 similar	 story	 applies	 to	 Portugal.	While	 this	 country	 already	







new	 funding?	To	address	 this	question,	we	 look	at	patterns	of	debt	 issuance.	Based	on	data	
from	Dealogic,	Table	4	describes	the	dynamics	on	primary	markets,	public	and	private,	 in	the	
two	months	 preceding	 and	 the	 two	months	 following	 the	 announcements.	 The	 key	 issue	 is	
whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 extension	 of	 maturities	 and	 the	 reduction	 in	 interest	
payments	 benefiting	 the	 sovereign	 have	 eased	 borrowing	 conditions	 also	 for	 the	 private	
sector.	 There	 is	 in	 fact	 ample	 evidence	 that	 sovereign	 spreads	 are	 strongly	 correlated	 with	
private	borrowing	 costs,	 and	 systematically	 lead	 them	 (see	Bahaj	 (2014)	or	Brutti	 and	 Saure	
(2016)).	 Given	 the	 effects	 of	 programme	 changes	 in	 the	 secondary	markets	 for	 government	
debt,	 we	 expect	 borrowing	 to	 become	 cheaper,	 and	 available	 at	 longer	 horizons,	 to	 both	








2012.	 In	 Portugal,	 instead,	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 changes	 was	 accompanied	 by	 some	
action	 in	 sovereign	primary	markets.	Two	months	after	 the	announcement,	although	at	very	
low	volumes,	the	Portuguese	public	sector	was	accessing	the	market	at	lower	yields	and	longer	
maturities	 (4.8	 versus	 3.1	 years).	 Similarly,	 after	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 March	 2013	
maturity	extension,	 the	average	maturity	of	public	 issuance	doubled	(from	4.7	to	10.8	years)	
and,	simultaneously,	 the	volumes	 issued	also	 increased	(from	2.55	to	3	billion).	Nonetheless,	
we	should	mention	here	that	the	“snapshot”	in	the	table	may	obscure	the	fact	that,	relative	to	





We	 also	 document	 interesting	 dynamics	 for	 private	 sector	 financing.	 In	 Ireland,	 the	 initial	
signing	of	the	programme	did	not	help	corporates	access	the	bond	market.	Yet,	there	is	some	




Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	
Signing	of	the	
programme 28-Nov-10 -- -- -- -- -- --
Maturity	and	
interest	rate 21-Jul-11 -- -- -- -- -- --
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 30.05 -- 4.15² -- 30.7 --
Signing	of	the	
programme
28-Nov-10 6.25 3.17 6.34 6.14 5.1 3.1
Maturity	and	
interest	rate
21-Jul-11 2.25 2.61 5.25 4.00 4.4 3.6




Dealogic	and	authors '	ca lculations .	Volume	is 	expressed	in	bi l l ion	Euros .	Ex-ante	(Ex-post)	refers 	to	2	months 	before	(after)	the	announcement	of	




Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	 Ex-ante Ex-post	
Signing	of	the	
programme 05-May-11 4.32 0.33 5.81 5.13 4.7 1.9
Maturity	and	
interest	rate 21-Jul-11 1.88 0.07 5.13 4.70 3.1 4.8
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 2.55 3.00 4.89 5.66 4.7 10.8
Signing	of	the	
programme
05-May-11 0.46 1.74 4.82 2.80 3.6 3.0
Maturity	and	
interest	rate
21-Jul-11 1.82 2.48 5.61 --¹ 3.1 4.7
Maturity	 16-Mar-13 0.97 0.61 5.89 5.60 12.3 6.0
Dealogic	and	authors '	ca lculations .	Volume	is 	expressed	in	bi l l ion	Euros .	Ex-ante	(Ex-post)	refers 	to	2	months 	before	(after)	the	announcement	of	
the	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	loan.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																		













Under	 the	 current	 arrangements,	 the	 IMF	 is	 a	 senior	 creditor	 to	 markets	 and	 any	 other	
institution;	next	is	the	ESM,	which	however	may	decide	to	wave	its	seniority,	followed	by	the	
EFSF,	and	external	private	creditors	and	bond-holders,	all	pari	passu.59	




the	 official	 lender	 claims	 seniority.	 This	 line	 of	 reasoning	was	 embraced	when	 the	 ESM	was	
created	in	2011,	moving	away	from	the	pari-passu	approach	initially	pursued	through	the	EFSF.	
During	 the	 euro	 area	 crisis,	 the	 seniority	 status	 of	 official	 lenders	 became	 an	 especially	
contentious	 issue.60	The	core	problem	is	well	known:	while	seniority	serves	to	better	protect	
tax-payers	money,	 a	 key	 risk	with	 it	 is	 that	 the	 subordination	 of	 private	 investors	 can	 have	








one	 way	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 consists	 of	 enhancing	 programme	 flexibility	 through	
refinancing.63	 Indeed,	 it	 is	not	 infrequent	that,	when	IMF	programmes	fail	 to	catalyse	private	





















refinance	previous	official	 loans.	Critics	stress	that,	when	this	 is	case,	 the	problems	 inherited	
by	outstanding	programmes	that	under-perform	may	limit	the	capacity	of	new	IMF	lending	to	
catalyse	private	funding,	and	undermine	the	status	of	the	IMF	as	an	impartial	decision	maker	
(see	 e.g.,	 Simpson	 2006).	 The	 IMF’s	 own	 exposure	 may	 complicate	 its	 role	 in	 impartially	







set	with	 a	 view	of	 smoothening	 repayment	 schedules	 to	 avoid	 substantial	 overlaps	with	 the	
IMF.	When	 the	 loan	 structure	 is	 rigidly	 front-loaded,	 indeed	 repayments	may	 kick	 in	 exactly	
when	 a	 country	 is	 trying	 to	 re-enter	 the	market---see	 the	 experience	 of	 Greece	 during	 the	
summer	of	2016,	when	bond	repayments	became	due	in	tandem	with	IMF	loan	repayments.			
In	 short,	when	official	 loans	 are	 large,	 it	 is	 particularly	 important	 to	 set	 the	 terms	of	official	
lending	as	to	address	possible	issues	raised	by	seniority.	This	argument	adds	to	a	related	one,	





the	 form	 of	 both	 market	 under-pricing	 of	 risks	 (under	 expectations	 of	 a	 bail-out)	 and	 a	
government	 reluctance	 to	 implement	 costly	 reforms,	 may	 have	 even	 more	 bite	 if	 lending		








prospective	 program)	 Greece	 could	 not	 access	 IMF	 funds	 without	 engaging	 in	 a	 debt	
restructuring	 exercise	 of	 its	 privately	 held	 public	 debt	 (often	 referred	 to	 as	 Private	 Sector	
Involvement,	 PSI).	 This	 view	was	 by	 no	means	 unchallenged.	 There	was	 deep	 disagreement	









a	 credit	 event	 in	 an	 OECD	 economy.	 In	 the	 shadow	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Lehman	 Brothers	
bankruptcy,	many	feared	that	PSI	in	an	advanced	country	would	be	interpreted	as	a	template	
to	 be	 followed	 by	 other	 stressed	 economies,	 triggering	 contagion.	 Relatedly,	 others	 feared	
that,	 given	 the	degree	of	 financial	 interconnectedness	within	 the	euro	area	and	exposure	of	
global	lenders	to	Greece,	spillovers	would	destabilise	the	still	shaky	European	banking	sector.	





this	remarkable	change	in	the	terms	of	 lending,	 it	 is	 important	to	consider	that,	 in	 important	
dimensions,	the	euro	area	countries,	advanced-economies	members	of	a	monetary	union,	do	
not	 fit	 the	 profile	 of	 a	 standard	 IMF	 programme	 country.	 Not	 only	 monetary	 policy	 and	
exchange	rate	adjustment	are	off	 the	table.	The	 level	of	 integration	and	 interconnectedness,	
both	 real	 and	 financial,	 is	 far	 greater	 than	 in	 any	 other	 world	 region.65	 The	 two-year	 delay	
before	pursuing	any	PSI	 in	the	euro	area	 indeed	reflected	widespread	concerns	that	calling	a	
debt	restructuring	would	have	had	larger	costs	than	attempting	to	address	the	crisis	through	
the	 standard	 combination	 of	 domestic	 adjustment	 and	 official	 support	 (see	 Buchheit	 and	
Gulati	2017	or	IMF	2014).66		
Based	on	two	key	arguments,	the	IMF’s	own	assessment	of	its	role	in	Greece	was	sanguine.	If	
solvency	 is	 not	 guaranteed,	 the	possibility	 that	 large	 amounts	of	 official	 funds	 end	up	being	
used	to	bail-out	private	creditors	would	put	the	role	of	IMF	as	official	lender	at	risk.	Moreover,	
as	 these	 interventions	 reduce	 exposure	 of	 private	 lenders	 to	 the	 crisis	 country,	 they	
correspondingly	 decrease	 the	 scope	 for	 risk	 sharing	 between	 investors	 and	 borrowing	
countries,	through	either	refinancing	or	debt	restructuring	(see	IMF	2014).67		
Correspondingly,	 the	 solution	 went	 into	 two	 different	 directions.	 First,	 the	 exemption	 was	
dropped	 and	 replaced	 by	 the	 requirement	 that	 other	 official	 creditors	 commit	 to	 cover	 any	






















country	 should	 be	 bailed	 out	 to	 avoid	 significant	 systemic	 consequences	 and	 cross-border	
spillovers,	the	most	affected	countries	should	be	(rationally)	willing	to	intervene	and	prevent	a	
crisis,	at	least	up	to	the	costs	they	would	suffer	as	a	consequence	of	the	crisis	(see	Tirole	2015).	
The	 argument	 implicitly	 assumes	 that	 these	 costs	 can	 be	 internalized	 more	 effectively	 via	
official	arrangements	at	regional	or	global	levels,	rather	than	via	IMF.	
Second,	 concerned	with	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 increasing	degree	of	bail-in	both	distorted	market	
incentives	 (de	 facto	 provides	 a	 blank	 check	 to	 the	 market)	 and	 put	 taxpayers’	 money	 into	
jeopardy,	 the	 Fund	 called	 for	 mechanisms	 for	 engineering	 voluntary	 bail-ins	 (IMF	 2013).	 In	
cases	 where	 sustainability	 is	 uncertain,	 a	 voluntarily	 roll-over	 would	 reduce	 the	 volume	 of	
Funds	 required	 from	 the	 official	 sector,	 while	 guaranteeing	 that	 the	 private	 sector	 retains	




would	voluntarily	participate	 in	mechanisms	of	bail-ins.	A	number	of	proposals,	 for	 instance,	
calls	for	more	automaticity,	in	the	form	of	(soft)	restructurings	(sometimes	referred	to	as	debt	
reprofiling)	 to	 accompany	 official	 lending.68	 The	 core	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 automaticity	 is	
that,	provided	it	can	be	credibly	 implemented	ex	post,	 it	would	enhance	market	discipline	ex	
ante,	and	thus	deliver	 long	run	benefits	 in	 the	 form	of	a	 lower	 incidence	of	crises	 (Andritzky	
and	Schumacher	2016).	The	core	criticism	is	that	automaticity	could	exacerbate	pro-cyclicality	
(Strauch	 2017).	 The	 terms	 of	 this	 debate	 are	well	 understood	 (on	 the	 IMF’s	 framework,	 for	
instance,	a	similar	discussion	has	developed	around	the	fact	DSA	unavoidably	foreshadows	the	
possibility	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 restructuring).	 If	 official	 support	 would	 be	 even	 more	 closely	
associated	 with	 debt	 restructuring,	 the	 prospect	 of	 an	 official	 programme	 may	 worsen	 the	





the	analysis	of	 costs	 and	 cross-border	 spillovers	 from	debt	 restructuring,	define	another	 key	
area	 in	 urgent	 need	 of	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 work.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 going	 into	 the	
direction	 of	 making	 the	 link	 between	 official	 lending	 and	 debt	 restructuring	 mechanical	 is	
bound	 to	 magnify	 the	 risks	 of	 perverse	 effects	 (which,	 in	 a	 currency	 union	 among	 highly	











70	 It	 is	 worth	 stressing	 that,	 within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 monetary	 union,	 the	 rule-book	 of	 the	 ESM	 explicitly	
contemplates	 insolvency	 as	 a	potential	 scenario,	 i.e.,	 sovereign	defaults	 cannot	be	 ruled	out.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	
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all,	 the	 question	 is	 how	 to	 engineer	 a	 mix	 of	 bail-ins	 and	 bail-outs	 that	 creates	 the	 right	






on	 the	 idea	 of	 catalytic	 finance,	 i.e.	 official	 loans	 are	 meant	 to	 catalyse	 private	 investors’	
financing.71	 Since	 countries	 resorting	 to	 the	 IMF	 typically	 face	 difficulties	 in	 servicing	 its	




the	horizon	of	 the	 IMF	programmes	 is	 limited	 to	a	 few	years,	with	a	pricing	 schedule	 that	 is	
increasing,	both	 in	size	and	over	time,	as	an	 incentive	for	the	authorities	to	repay	early	 (IMF	
2016b).72	
As	key	motivation	and	conceptual	underpinning	of	the	catalytic	finance	model	 lies	 in	the	fact	
that	 economies	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 liquidity	 crisis,	 whereas	 private	 investors	 coordinate	
expectations	 on	 default	 that	 is	 not	 justified	 by	 economic	 fundamentals,	 but	 is	 the	 result	 of	
belief-driven	 runs	 on	 a	 country’s	 sovereign	 bond	market.73	However,	 as	 discussed	 by	 recent	
contributions	by	Tirole	(2015),	Niepmann	and	Schmidt	Eisenlohr	(2013),	and	Corsetti,	Erce	and	
Uy	 (2017),	 what	 motivates	 official	 support	 needs	 not	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 model	 of	 catalytic	
finance.	 The	 importance	 of	 this	 point	 for	 the	 euro	 area,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 global	 institutions,	
cannot	be	overstated.	
A	key	rationale	for	going	beyond	catalytic	finance	builds	on	the	observation	that	default	by	one	
country	may	have	 large	 spillovers	abroad,	 causing	output	and	 financial	 costs	across	borders.	
Because	of	these	costs,	 it	 is	rational	 for	foreign	governments	to	 intervene	and	help	the	crisis	
country	 to	 service	 its	 debt,	 at	 least	 up	 to	 the	 full	 extent	 of	 the	 costs	 they	may	 suffer	 if	 the	
country	 defaults.	 In	 this	 setting,	 spillover	 costs	 play	 the	 role	 of	 ‘collateral’,	 against	 which	 a	
country	 can	 increase	 its	 borrowing.	 In	 this	 context,	 some	 form	 of	 self-interested	 solidarity	
motivated	 by	 spillovers	 is	 arguably	 unavoidable.	 But	 when	 deployed	 in	 a	 decentralized,	






73	 Although	 the	 coordination	 mechanism	 is	 not	 sufficiently	 understood,	 the	 literature	 has	 long	 recognized	 the	
pervasiveness	of	the	problem	(Calvo	1988,	Cole	and	Kehoe	2000),	increasingly	so	after	the	global	crisis	(Corsetti	and	








uncoordinated	 fashion,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 efficient.	 The	 contribution	 by	 Tirole	 (2005)	 shows	 that	
there	are	ample	margins	 for	 improving	social	welfare,	by	designing	common	institutions	that	
combine	prospective	bailouts	with	some	ex-ante	discipline	on	the	size	of	borrowing.74		
In	 Corsetti	 Erce	 and	 Uy	 (2017),	 we	 pursue	 a	 similar	 idea,	 but	 from	 a	 different	 angle.	 Our	
starting	point	 is	not	 the	possibility	of	cross-border	spillovers,	but	 the	 large	costs	 that	default	








designed	 as	 to	 make	 the	 country	 indifferent	 between	 loosing	 output	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	
default,	and	using	output	to	service	 its	official	debt.	The	 lending	 institution	gives	the	country	
the	 opportunity	 to	 avoid	 wasteful	 losses	 associated	 with	 default,	 by	 choosing	 to	 enter	 a	
programme	 entailing	 caps	 on	 its	 borrowing.	 In	 exchange,	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 charged	 on	 the	
official	 loans	must	 create	 an	 economic	 incentive	 for	 the	 country	 to	 enter	 voluntarily	 in	 the	
deal.	 An	 outline	 of	 the	 mechanism,	 together	 with	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 successful	
implementation,	is	detailed	in	Appendix	D.		
The	analysis	leaves	at	least	three	important	areas	for	research	open.	First,	the	bailout	must	be	
desirable	from	the	perspective	of	the	 lending	 institution.	This	raises	the	 issue	of	defining	the	
objective	function	of	such	institution.	This	passage	is	crucial	for	assessing	the	risk	of	potential	
losses	against	the	benefits	of	‘saving	on	wasteful	default	costs’.	Second,	removing	the	‘market	
discipline’	 of	 default,	 a	 bailout	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 fundamental	 default	 creates	 adverse	
incentives.	This	raises	issues	in	conditionality	and	program	credibility.		
The	last	question	concerns	potential	trade-offs	between	enhancing	market	access,	raising	debt	
sustainability,	 and	 long	 run	 inefficiencies	 associated	with	 higher	 overall	 level	 of	 debt.	 As	we	
show	in	Corsetti	et	al	2017,	official	loans	can	be	designed	to	increase	the	debt	levels	at	which	
the	country	is	sheltered	from	self-fulfilling	crises.	To	the	extent	that	higher	debt	sustainability	
leads	 a	 government	 to	 issue	 more	 debt,	 this	 reduces	 long	 run	 consumption,	 making	 the	
country	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 fundamental	 risk.	 For	 bad	 fundamentals,	 default	 occurs	 more	
often.	 This	 trade-off	 between	 sheltering	 the	 country	 from	 rollover	 risk	 and	 creating	 the	
conditions	 for	more	 fundamental	default	 can	be	ameliorated	exactly	 in	 the	way	 that	current	












of	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund.	 This	 paper	 documents	 how	 the	 incremental	 official	
response	to	the	unfolding	crisis	brought	to	the	spotlight	a	number	of	unresolved	issues	in	the	
design	of	official	support.	It	also	discusses	how	the	euro	area	experience	can	inform	the	role	of	
the	 official	 sector	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	 future	 crises,	 holding	 lessons	 for	 global	 and	 other	
regional	safety	nets.	
The	 euro	 area	 crisis	 has	 certainly	 enriched	 the	 debate	 on	 official	 lending	 in	 novel	 crucial	
dimensions.		A	first	dimension	concerns	the	need	to	recognize	that	debt	sustainability	and	the	
extent	 to	which	 official	 support	 programmes	 are	 successful	 in	 restoring	 growth	 and	market	
access,	 vary	 substantially	 with	 the	 terms	 of	 official	 support	 (see	 also	 Dias	 et	 al.	 2014	 or	
Gabriele	 et	 al.	 2017).	 In	 our	 view,	 improving	 official	 assistance	 requires	 a	 much	 better	
understanding	of	how	cash	flow	obligations	impact	on	the	sustainability	of	any	given	stock	of	
liabilities,	and	help	countries	implementing	growth	and	stability	policies.	
A	 second	 dimension	 concerns	 the	 need	 for	 reconsidering	 the	 goals	 of	 official	 lending.	 The	
traditional	approach	builds	on	the	 idea	that	financial	assistance	has	catalytic	effects,	 i.e.,	 it	 is	
functional	 to	maintain	or	 recreate	market	access.	The	recent	experience	with	official	 lending	









to	deploy	official	 lending---but	more	appropriately	 to	be	seen	as	constraints	 in	 the	design	of	
better	 official	 programmes.	 The	 traditional	 one	 is	 moral	 hazard,	 i.e.	 the	 risk	 that	 official	
support	has	perverse	incentives	on	governments	and	firms,	to	take	on	excessive	risk	and	not	to	





accumulate	 too	 much	 debt	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 make	 default	 more	 likely	 under	 fundamental	
stress.	Again,	not	surprisingly,	all	these	“counterarguments”	have	also	been	centre-stage	in	the	
debate	on	the	euro	area	crisis.	












Andritzky,	 J.,	 Christofzik,	 D.,	 Feld,	 L.,	 and	 U.	 Scheuering	 (2016),	 A	 Mechanism	 to	 Regulate	
Sovereign	Debt	Restructuring	in	the	euro	area,	CESifo	Working	Paper	Series	No.	6038.	








Bahaj,	 S.	 (2014),	 Systemic	 Sovereign	 Risk:	 Macroeconomic	 Implications	 in	 the	 euro	 area,	
Cambridge	INET	Working	Paper.	
Ban,	 C.,	 and	 K.	 Gallagher	 (2015),	 Recalibrating	 Policy	 Orthodoxy:	 The	 IMF	 since	 the	 Great	
Recession,	Governance,	28	(2):	131-146.	
Bank	of	Spain	(2017),	Informe	sobre	la	crisis	financiera	y	bancaria	en	España,	2008-2014.	
























Calvo,	 G.	 (1988),	 Servicing	 the	 Public	 Debt:	 The	 Role	 of	 Expectations,	 American	 Economic	
Review,	78(4):	647-661 
Caraway,	 T.,	 Rickard,	 S.	 J.,	 and	 M.	 Anner	 (2012),	 International	 Negotiations	 and	 Domestic	
Politics:	The	Case	of	IMF	Labor	Market	Conditionality,	International	Organization,	(66):	27-61.	
















Corsetti,	 G.,	 Feld,	 L.P.,	 Lane,	 P.,	 Reichlin,	 L.,	 Rey,	 H.,	 Vayanos,	 D.,	 and	 B.	 Weder	 di	 Mauro	
(2015),	A	New	Start	for	the	Eurozone:	Dealing	with	Debt.	CEPR	Monitoring	Euro	Zone	











Erce,	 A.	 (2014),	 Cross-Border	 Banking,	 Externalities	 and	 Sovereign	 Distress:	 Does	 the	 Euro	
Need	 a	 Common	Banking	Authority?,	 International	 Journal	 of	 Finance	 and	 Economics,	 19(3):	
188-203.	
ESFS/ESM	Financial	Assistance,	Evaluation	Report	(2017),	http://www.esm.europa.eu		
European	 Commission	 (1990),	 One	 market,	 one	 money	 –	 An	 evaluation	 of	 the	 potential	
benefits	and	costs	of	forming	an	economic	and	monetary	Union.	Euro	area	Economy,	44.	






European	 Financial	 Stability	 Facility	 (2010),	 Master	 Financial	 Assistance	 Facility	 Agreement	
between	EFSF	and	Ireland.		





European	 Union	 (2013),	 Council	 Implementing	 Decision	 of	 21	June	 2013	 amending	
Implementing	 Decision	 2011/77/EU	 on	 granting	 Union	 financial	 assistance	 to	 Ireland,	
European	Council,	Policy	Briefing.	




Gabriele,	 C.,	 Erce,	 A.,	 Athanasopoulos,	 M.,	 and	 J.	 Rojas	 (2017),	 Debt	 Stocks	 Meet	 Gross	
Financing	Needs:	A	Flow	perspective	into	Sustainability,	ESM	Working	Papers	No.	24.	
Ghezzi,	P.	(2012),	Official	lending:	Dispelling	the	lower	recovery	value	myth,	Vox	EU	(June).	
Gourinchas,	P.	 and	H.	Rey	 (2016),	Real	 Interest	Rates,	 Imbalances	and	 the	Curse	of	Regional	
Safe	Asset	Providers	at	the	Zero	Lower	Bound,	Prepared	for	the	ECB	Forum	on	Central	Banking.	
Greek	Public	Debt	Management	Agency,	Hellenic	Republic	Debt	Bulletin:	2010-2015,	All	issues.	














International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (2013b),	 Staff	 Guidance	 Note	 For	 Public	 Debt	 Sustainability	
Analysis	in	Market-access	Countries.	




International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (2014),	 The	 Fund’s	 Lending	 Framework	 and	 Sovereign	 Debt	 –	
Preliminary	Considerations,	Policy	Document	











Milesi-Ferreti,	G.M.,	and	P.	 Lane	 (2007),	The	external	wealth	of	nations	mark	 II:	Revised	and	














Müller,	A.,	 Storesletten,	K.,	 and	F.	 Zilibotti	 (2016),	 The	Political	Color	of	 Fiscal	Responsibility.	
Journal	of	the	European	Economic	Association,	14(1):	252-302.	
Niepmann,	 F.,	 and	 T.	 Schmidt-Eisenlohr	 (2013),	 Bank	 Bailouts,	 International	 Linkages,	 and	
Cooperation,	American	Economic	Journal:	Economic	Policy,	5(4):	270-305.	
Pisani-Ferry,	 J.,	 Sapir,	 A.,	 and	G.	Wolff	 (2013),	 EU-IMF	 assistance	 to	 euro	 area	 countries:	 an	
early	assessment,	Bruegel	Blueprint	19.	










Schumacher,	 J.,	 and	 B.	Weder	 di	Mauro	 (2016),	 Greek	 Debt	 Sustainability	 and	Official	 Crisis	
Lending,	Brookings	Papers	on	Economic	Activity,	46	(2):	279-305.		




Strauch,	 R.	 (2017),	 Sovereign	 debt	 overhangs	 and	 stabilisation	 policies,	 prepared	 for	 the	
Conference	“How	much	of	a	fiscal	union	for	the	EMU?”	held	at	Banco	de	España.	
Tirole,	 J.	 (2015),	 Country	 Solidarity	 in	 Sovereign	 Crises,	 American	 Economic	 Review,	 105(8):	
2333-2363.	
Trebesh,	 C.,	 and	 M.	 Zabel	 (2017),	 The	 Output	 Costs	 of	 Hard	 and	 Soft	 Sovereign	 Default,	
European	Economic	Review,	92:416-432.	










Appendix A: Institutional coordination in programme design 
The	 Institutions	 refers	 to	 the	 team	 of	 representatives	 of	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	
(IMF),	 the	 euro	 area	 Commission	 (EC)	 and	 the	 euro	 area	 Central	 Bank	 (ECB)	 in	 charge	 of	 a	
country’s	 programme.75	 This	 team	 is	 the	 vehicle	 for	 negotiation	 and	 financial	 evaluation	
(Pisani-Ferry	et	al.,	2013).	Assessments,	although	separately	prepared	by	IMF	and	EC,	in	liaison	




to	 the	Board	of	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund	a	Memorandum	of	Economic	and	Financial	
Policies	(MEFP),	spelling	out	the	policy	strategy,	policy	actions	and	numerical	targets.	 In	turn,	
the	 EC	 requests	 authorities	 to	 submit	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 (MoU)	 with	 more	
detailed	and	specific	conditionality.	While	MoU	and	MEFP	aren’t	identical,	they	are	consistent	
with	 each	 other.	 One	 important	 implication	 of	 this	 difference	 is	 that	 the	 conditionality	
imposed	by	the	IMF	is	narrower	than	that	of	the	European	Commission.	
Table	A1	summarizes	the	division	of	labour	in	programme	design.	While	there	is	no	systematic	
evidence	 on	 the	 division	 of	 labour,	 the	 IMF	 has	 more	 experience	 with	 the	 provision	 of	
assistance	 and	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 more	 expertise	 on	 euro	 area	 economic	 and	


























Appendix B: A summary of the euro area programmes 
Greece 
In	 late	 2009,	 after	 recognising	 they	 had	 manipulated	 their	 fiscal	 accounts,	 the	 Greek	
Government	 approached	 its	 euro	 area	 partners	 asking	 for	 help,	 who	 at	 first	 asked	 for	 a	
significant	 fiscal	adjustment.77	As	 this	 strategy	 failed	and	 the	situation	spin	out	of	 control,	 in	




From	 its	 side,	 the	 IMF	 contributed	 with	 a	 30	 billion	 euro	 Stand-by-Agreement	 with	 3-years	
duration,	a	maturity	of	 five	years,	 the	standard	200	bps	 for	credit	above	300%	of	 the	quota,	
and	additional	100	bps	for	credit	outstanding	after	3	years.	
By	mid-2011,	 despite	 that	 the	 first	 programme	 reviews	 spoke	 of	 “an	 impressive	 start”,	 the	
situation	 took	a	 turn	 for	 the	worst.	 The	 reasons	 for	 the	 set-back	were	excessively	optimistic	
projections,	initial	official	indecision,	weak	programme	implementation	and	the	excessive	cost	
of	initial	funding	conditions.	The	reaction	of	the	authorities	was	to	provide	additional	support	
by	 modifying	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 GLF.	 	 Despite	 these	 additional	 measures,	 by	 early	 2012,	 it	
became	clear	that	Greece	would	not	make	it	without	a	contribution	from	its	shrinking	private-






















In	 Ireland,	 banks	 had	 fueled	 a	mortgage	 boom	 in	 the	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 global	 crisis.79	 As	 a	
result,	 the	price	 for	real	state	had	more	than	tripled	 in	a	decade.	When	the	bubble	burst,	 to	
prevent	a	 financial	 collapse,	 the	government	was	 forced	 to	provide	 its	 taxpayers’	 support	 to	
the	country’s	financial	institutions.		
In	December	2010,	overburdened	by	the	housing	bubble	burst	and	the	subsequent	bail	out	its	
banking	 system,	 Ireland	 became	 the	 first	 client	 of	 the	 EFSF	 and	 the	 EFSM.	 The	 Irish	
programme,	designed	to	re-establish	a	sound	economic	and	financial	situation	and	to	restore	
its	capacity	to	finance	itself	on	the	financial	markets,	provided	a	financing	package	of	85	billion	




Despite	 the	 official	 support,	 by	 mid-2011,	 spreads	 had	 crept	 up	 to	 unsustainable	 levels.	
According	 to	Pisani-Ferry	et	al.	 (2013),	 the	bad	sovereign	bond-market	performance	was	 the	
result	 of	 the	 effect	 on	 public	 debt	 of	 excessively	 rapid	 deleveraging	 and	 the	 bail-out	 of	 the	
banks’	 junior	creditors.	 In	an	attempt	to	provide	further	support	 to	 Ireland,	 the	terms	of	 the	
financial	agreement	were	modified	in	July	2011.	In	addition	to	fully	eliminating	the	margin	for	
both	 EFSM	 and	 EFSF	 loans,	 the	 maturity	 of	 both	 loans	 was	 extended	 by	 seven	 years,	 to	 a	
maximum	of	15	years.	An	additional,	and	final,	change	in	the	financing	terms	occurred	in	April	
2013,	 when	 authorities	 decided	 that	 EFSF	 and	 EFSM	 loan	 maturities	 would	 be	 further	
extended	to	22	years.	
During	 its	 three-year	 assistance	 programme,	 Ireland	 improved	 its	 financial	 regulation,	 and	
major	banks	were	closed	down,	while	some	of	the	remaining	firms	received	a	capital	boost.	A	


















Portugal’s	 economic	 growth	 was	 weak	 already	 before	 the	 crisis.81	 This	 lack	 of	 dynamism	
contributed	to	high	levels	of	debt,	both	public	and	private.	When	the	global	crisis	hit	Europe	in	
2010,	 the	 country	 had	 little	 fiscal	 space	 to	 support	 the	 economy	 or	 the	 banks,	 which	 also	
became	 the	 focus	 of	 investors,	 who	 were	 concerned	 that	 Portuguese	 banks	 were	 too	
dependent	 on	 a	 weak	 economy.	 Investors	 responded	 by	 demanding	 ever-higher	 returns	 on	
Portugal's	bonds.	





By	 mid-2011,	 the	 programme	 was	 risking	 going	 off-track.	 According	 to	 Pisani-Ferry	 et	 al.	
(2013),	 the	 programme	 relied	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 structural	 reforms	 which	 did	 not	
materialize.	In	reaction	to	these	negative	developments,	the	EFSF	and	the	EFSM	granted	to	the	
Portuguese	authorities	an	improvement	in	the	conditions	of	the	loans.	Thus,	on	July	2011,	the	
euro	 area	 governments	decided	 to	 fully	 eliminate	 the	margin	 for	both	EFSM	and	EFSF	 loans	
and	 to	 extend	 the	maturity	 of	 EFSM	and	 EFSF	 loans	 to	 a	maximum	of	 15	 years.	 In	 order	 to	
maintain	identical	conditions	in	Portugal	and	Ireland,	identical	to	what	was	done	with	the	Irish	
loan,	a	final	change	in	the	terms	of	the	EFSF	and	EFSM	programmes	occurred	in	April	2013.	On	
that	 date,	 authorities	 decided	 that	 EFSF	 and	 EFSM	 loan	 maturities	 would	 be	 extended	 by	
additional	7	and	half	years,	to	22	years.	
The	 funds	 received	 from	 the	 official	 sector	 were	 used	 by	 the	 authorities	 to	 finance	 budget	
deficits	and	recapitalize	 the	banks.	 In	accordance	with	 the	conditionality,	Portugal	embarked	
on	 policies	 to	 bring	 down	 budget	 deficits,	 resolve	 its	 banking	 problems	 and	 modernize	 its	
economy.	 The	 programme	helped	 the	 economy	 to	 recover,	 as	 it	 became	more	 competitive,	
exports	started	to	grow,	the	account	deficit	was	eliminated,	budget	deficits	were	significantly	















the	 Recapitalisation	 of	 Financial	 Institutions	 by	 the	 EFSF.83	 This	 came	 in	 response	 to	 the	
increasing	financial	stress	of	the	Spanish	economy,	materialized	in	the	accumulation	of	strong	
capital	outflows,	mostly	 from	non-resident	 sectors.	This	 translated	 into	a	 record	high	 spread	
against	the	10-year	Bund	since	the	implementation	of	the	Euro.	Increasing	the	resilience	of	the	
banking	 sector,	 in	 particular	 of	 the	 saving	 banks	 (“Cajas”)	 with	 heavy	 real	 estate-related	





assistance	 from	 the	 onset.	 The	 programme	 designed	 for	 Spain	was	 not	 oriented	 to	 tackle	 a	
balance	of	payments	problem,	but	a	structural	problem	on	the	banking	system.	Reflecting	the	
specific	 focus	 of	 the	 program,	 the	 attached	 conditionality	 contained	 in	 the	 MoU	 only	
addressed	financial	sector	issues,	but	also	required	Spain	to	fully	comply	with	its	commitments	
under	 the	 EDP	 and	 European	 Semester	 recommendations.	 Unlike	 standard	 economic	
adjustment	 programmes,	 this	 did	 not	 contain	 new	 specific	 conditions	 in	 fiscal	 policies	 and	
structural	reforms.	As	a	result,	 the	programme	design	and	 implementation	deviated	so	much	
from	 the	 IMF’s	 programme	 template	 that	 the	 Fund	 could	 not	 participate	 financially.	 In	 this	
way,	 Spain	 became	 the	 first	 euro	 area	 country	 to	 be	 treated	 by	 the	 euro	 area	 safety	 net	 in	
financial	 solitude.	 The	 main	 objective	 of	 the	 programme	 was	 to	 increase	 the	 long-term	
resilience	of	 the	banking	 sector,	by	 removing	doubts	about	asset	quality,	orderly	downsizing	
bank	exposures	to	the	real	estate	sector,	restoring	market-based	funding	,	and	enhancing	risk	
identification	and	crisis	management	mechanism	(EC,	2016).		
The	ESM	programme	granted	 the	authorities	 access	 to	up	 to	100	billion	euro,	 about	10%	of	
GDP.	 Eventually,	 only	 41.3	 EUR	 bill	 were	 actually	 disbursed	 in	 two	 tranches,	 the	 first	 in	
December	2012	and	the	second	in	February	2013.	Later,	Spain	made	a	repayment	of	0.3	EUR	
bill	related	to	the	unused	funds	in	2014,	which	according	to	the	terms	of	the	ESM	facility	must	












Cyprus	 joined	 the	 euro	 in	 2008,	 which	 allowed	 it	 borrow	 cheaply	 to	 support	 the	 economy,	
which	 had	 weakened	 following	 the	 global	 crisis.84	 The	 first	 signs	 of	 distress	 in	 the	 banking	
sector	appeared	 in	2010.	The	banks	had	grown	too	 rapidly.	The	 ratios	of	deposits	and	 liquid	
liabilities	to	GDP	were	the	highest	in	Europe.	The	Cypriot	regulatory	framework	contributed	to	
the	large	inflows	of	capital	into	the	country’s	banks	and	property	market.	85	
Markets	 started	 to	 take	a	negative	view.	By	mid-2011,	Cyprus	was	no	 longer	able	 to	borrow	
money	 from	 investors.	 Cyprus	 addressed	 a	 request	 for	 stability	 support	 to	 the	 ESM	and	 the	
IMF	on	June	2012.	The	economic	adjustment	programme	was	 intended	to	address	short	and	
medium-term	 financial,	 fiscal	 and	 structural	 challenges	 facing	 Cyprus.	 Following	 a	 severe	
downturn	 that	 reduced	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 lending	 portfolio,	 and	 faced	 with	 losses	 on	 the	
holdings	 of	Greek	 sovereign	 bonds,	 the	 banking	 system	 in	 Cyprus	went	 into	 severe	 distress.	
The	 key	programme	objectives	were	 to	 restore	 the	 soundness	of	 the	Cypriot	banking	 sector	
and	rebuild	market	confidence	by	restructuring	and	downsizing	financial	institutions.	
In	Cyprus,	 the	 template	 replicated	earlier	EFSF	programmes,	 and	both	 the	ESM	and	 the	 IMF	
contributed	to	the	programme.	The	ESM	contributed	with	EUR	9	bill	and	the	IMF	with	1	EUR	1	
bill	 respectively.	 The	 IMF	 provided	 support	 under	 a	 7-year	 EFF	 agreement	 with	 the	 usual	
pricing	 structure.	 In	 turn,	 the	 ESM	 loan	 to	 Cyprus	 had	 a	 15	 years	maturity,	 extending	 up	 to	
2030.	The	margin	charged	by	the	ESM	is	10	bps.	
Following	 the	 program	 conditionality,	 Cyprus	 restructured	 and	 recapitalized	 its	 banks,	
improved	 financial	 regulation	 and	 supervision,	 and	modernized	 its	 legal	 framework	 (to	 help	
deal	with	the	high	level	of	nonperforming	loans).	Additionally,	fiscal	deficits	shrunk,	mitigating	








































































Appendix D: Addressing fundamental default r isk through cash-f low 
management 
Corsetti	Erce	and	Uy	(2017)	illustrates	the	idea	of	lending	into	the	‘cost	of	default’	adopting	a	
standard	 three-period	 model	 of	 default	 (see	 e.g.	 Arellano	 and	 Ramanarayanan	 (2012).	 We	
focus	 on	 an	 economy	 where	 the	 initial	 debt	 is	 high	 enough	 that	 the	 country	 would	 find	 it	
optimal	to	default	in	case	of	bad	realization	of	fundamentals	(e.g.,	an	economic	downturn)	in	
the	second	period.	Hence,	the	country	can	only	issue	default-risky	bonds,	at	a	premium.	
Suppose	 that	default	entails	a	 loss	as	high	as	5	percent	of	 its	output,	and,	 in	 the	absence	of	
official	support,	the	country	would	be	able	to	issue	debt	of	both	one	and	two	period	maturity.	
These	 liabilities	will	be	risky	 in	 the	sense	that	markets	anticipate	repayment	 in	period	2	only	
conditional	on	 the	realization	of	good	 fundamentals---the	country	will	default	 in	a	 recession.	
So	 markets	 know	 that	 they	 can	 borrow	 only	 against	 repayments	 in	 expansions.	 More	
specifically,	 how	much	 debt	 is	 sustainable	 is	 pinned	 down	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 country	 will	
service	its	debt	up	to	5	percent	of	output	in	an	expansion---beyond	that	level;	it	will	be	rational	
for	the	country	to	default	also	when	fundamentals	are	good.	
In	 such	 a	 situation,	 official	 lending	 can	 increase	 debt	 sustainability	 by	 ruling	 out	 default	
altogether	 as	 follows:	 an	 international	 institution	 design	 a	 programme	 that	 make	 the	
government	 at	 least	 indifferent	 between	 (a)	 not	 paying	 its	 official	 debt	 in	 period	 2	 and	
suffering	 a	 5	 percent	 contraction	 in	 output	 in	 the	 downturn,	 and	 (b)	 using	 an	 equivalent	
amount	 of	 resources	 to	 service	 its	 official	 debt	 and	 avoid	 default.	 We	 show	 that	 this	
programme	can	be	implemented	through	official	loans	of	two-period	maturity,	combined	with	
a	cap	on	borrowing,	and	raise	social	welfare	in	the	country	in	each	period.	




below	 the	 cost	 of	 funding	 for	 the	 official	 lender.	 Second,	 as	 in	 Tirole	 (2015),	 official	 lending	
must	 be	 associated	 to	 a	 credible	 cap	 on	 the	 country	 borrowing	 from	 the	 market---since,	
conditional	 on	 receiving	 the	 bailout,	 the	 government	 has	 an	 incentive	 to	 issue	 more	 risky	














Appendix E:  Dataset on the Official  Loans to euro area countries 
We	assembled	a	dataset	with	details	on	the	terms	of	the	official	loans	to	the	crisis	countries	in	
the	 euro	 area.	 For	 each	 loan,	 the	 dataset	 includes	 sizes,	 maturities	 and	 interest	 rates.	 We	
organize	 the	 information	 in	 two	 spread	 sheets.	 One	 includes	 evolution	 of	 the	 loans	 as	 they	
were	 disbursed	 (quantities,	 interest	 rates	 and	maturities).	 The	 second	 spreadsheet	 contains	
details	on	the	repayment	profiles	generated	by	the	official	loans.	
The	time	series	for	interest	rates	has	been	built	by	modifying	the	series	provided	through	the	
ESM	webpage	with	 the	 detailed	 information	 from	 the	 programmes.	 Adjustments	 to	 interest	
rates	were	done	as	detailed	in	the	main	text.	In	turn,	the	series	on	maturities	were	built	using	
detailed	programme	information.	We	built	the	time	series	on	outstanding	exposure	using	the	
information	 on	 individual	 tranche	 disbursement	 available	 from	 the	 European	 Stability	
Mechanism	 webpage.	 The	 data	 on	 repayment	 profile	 can	 be	 retrieved	 from	 the	 European	
Stability	Mechanism	webpage.		
We	make	our	dataset	on	the	official	 loans	provided	by	the	euro	area	 institutions	available	at	
the	 address:	 https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlocorsetti/	 and	 the	 website	 of	 ADEMU	
http://ademu-project.eu	
	
The	dataset	posted	 reports	 the	 repayment	profiles	 for	 ESM	and	EFSF	 loans	 as	of	 the	end	of	
2016.	
	
	
